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Danny Marrero has written a fascinating and challenging paper on the evaluation of 
arguments in the context of incommensurable cultural differences. He cites two tough 
examples to illustrate the problem. One involves the decision by an aboriginal couple to 
temporarily abandon their twin children to the welfare authorities while the “divinities” 
decide whether the twins could come back to the couple. The problem is that twins are 
seen as an imperfection of nature and a threat to the community. The second example 
concerned whether a decision by an indigenous court to give a convicted murder 60 
lashes was in violation of the anti-torture provisions of the Columbian constitution. The 
indigenous court favored this punishment because lashes had powers of purification and 
would allow the convict to return to the community after punishment. 
Marrero argues that the criterion of acceptability as put forward by Blair and 
Johnson, (basically, that a premise should be acceptable to the interlocutor) is 
inappropriate in an argumentative context which involves arguments between two 
radically different cultural perspectives. The criterion is inappropriate because it would 
judge as fallacious an argument that did not use premises which were acceptable to both 
sides. According to Marrero, Blair and Johnson would describe such refusal to find 
common-ground premises as ethnocentric. Ironically, as Marrero points out, it is perhaps 
ethnocentric to think that an arguer should have to adopt mutually acceptable premises as 
that may involve a requirement to that arguers abandon their cultural beliefs and utilize 
beliefs of the other culture. Marrero argues that the representatives of one culture 
(usually, the less dominant culture) should not have to abandon their premises in order to 
avoid the charge of having made a fallacious argument. 
Marrero argues that instead, the criterion for premise acceptability should be one 
of coherence with cultural beliefs. This means that any premise, however implausible 
strange or unacceptable to the interlocutor, would be appropriate provided that it cohered 
with existing culture beliefs of the arguer. Presumably an argument would be a good one 
(or at least non-fallacious), if the (“coherent”) premises provided reasonable support for 
the conclusion. For example, the fact that lashes contain magical powers to purify 
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certainly provides reasonable grounds, ceteris paribus, for use of the lash as a form of 
punishment.1
While Marrero's examples, taken from the situation in Colombia are striking, they 
are a not an uncommon problem in the kind of multicultural context in which we live as 
Canadians. There is a long history of litigation over the claim of Jehovah Witness parents 
of the right to refuse blood transfusions for their children because on their view the Bible 
prohibits such use of blood products. More recently, there has been debate about how to 
address the deeply troubling practice of clitorectomy. 
It seems to me that there are a two ways of approaching the argumentation 
problem in a situation of radical cultural differences. 1. If the purpose of an argument is 
to provide justification, then using the criteria of coherence, as proposed by Marrero, 
seems reasonable. One could understand why people who believed twins are an 
imperfection of nature and a threat to the well-being of the community would want to 
engage in infanticide. Such an argument has internal coherence and can provide 
understanding to an interlocutor regardless of whether the interlocutor agrees or disagrees 
with the premises. Believing that a blood transfusion will result in a child being 
condemned to eternal damnation, provides an understandable reason for opposing such a 
transfusion. 2. If, on the other hand, you wish to persuade someone that they should 
adopt such practices or that one’s practices are acceptable, then an arguer must use shared 
premises. 
The problem is compounded in the Columbian case (as it often in these cases) by 
the complexity of the interrelationships between the dominant ruling culture and the 
aboriginal cultures which the new constitution appears to be designed to respect and 
protect. Because of the asymmetry of power between the group making the argument and 
the court receiving the argument, the court must be especially solicitous of views of the 
subordinate culture. Again a Canadian comparison: in the court cases involving land 
claims in BC, the courts have agreed to accept traditional story telling as a source of 
evidence for occupancy and use of the land. Such stories cohere with aboriginal traditions 
for establishing claims, though they do not fit with standard legal practice of evidence 
concerning land. 
But as in the case of clitorectomy, when a practice however coherently justified 
within the subculture violates crucial human rights from the perspective of the dominant 
culture, I do not see how the courts can accept the argument of those attempting to argue 
for the justification of that practice. 
But from Marrero's point of view this is not the issue. The question for him is 
whether it is appropriate to describe an argument based on premises that are unacceptable 
to interlocutor as fallacious. I agree with him the argument is not fallacious but, of 
course, it will not be rationally and reasonably persuasive to the interlocutor. That is to 
say, interlocutor is reasonably justified in not accepting the conclusion of the argument 
because he or she does not find the premises upon which the argument is based to be 
acceptable. On the other hand the arguer is justified in making his or her case based on 
                                                 
1 While Marrero does not spend much time on the problems associated with the application of the 
coherence criterion, I just note in passing that it is unlikely that any set of cultural beliers are reliably 
coherent. This incoherence is one of the reasons that analytic philosophers can find employment. For 
example, the ideas that the all events are determined and that humans engage in free actions appear to be 
incoherent and such incoherence presents frequent problems for judicial and moral decision making. 
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the metaphysical premises which provide the basis of that position because that is the 
justification within that cultural framework. Marrero suggests that adopting the coherence 
criterion for acceptability could be “the basis for a multicultural theory of argumentation 
that allows for a new understanding of argument in multicultural context.” 
I agree that respecting the arguments put forth by members of a different cultural 
community, based on premises which one does not find credible, is probably a 
precondition for any kind of civilized discussion. But I do think that we should keep in 
mind, as Marrero acknowledges, that we are trying to find a way of peacefully resolving 
disagreements. Given such a project, I would suggest that the pursuit of common ground, 
though possibly threatening for the subculture, is still a worthy one. For example I would 
counsel the U’WA to argue that they too to share a concern for children, that they too 
share a concern for community well-being, and that they recognize that they are living in 
a more complex social environment. Their decision to go to the welfare Institute already 
indicates an acknowledgment of these concerns and the new situation in which they find 
themselves. They could then acknowledge that while it might be the best thing for the 
twins is to be adopted as soon as possible, in this case, because of the cultural situation 
involved, the Institute should make an exception. I am not saying that the Institute should 
necessarily accept this argument. I'm only saying that such an argument is based on 
shared grounds and could provide a reasonable basis for the Institute to modify its 
decision. 
As to the issue of the lashes. Marrero notes that the Paes have already modified 
their punishment practices by abandoning the death penalty. Clearly the lashes were not 
designed to be torture, though given the name of the relevant law --“Convention Against 
Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading Treatment Or Punishment" – it would 
seem that the law prohibits more than torture. Clearly the prosecution was wrong to argue 
that the lashes were a form of torture. It probable, in the context in which this argument 
took place, that the court was right to allow the subculture to use its modes of punishment 
rather than interfere with it. Such a decision could be based on the shared premises that 
prima facie subculture practices should be respected, that the punishment, while cruel, 
had the benefit of allowing the convict to re-enter the community, etc.. In other words, 





Among other things, I think that Marrero’s argument illustrates the fact that the 
acceptability criterion is a quite different kind of criteria of argument quality than the 
other two. It appeals to the idea of a rational interlocutor in quite a different way than the 
other two criteria. While it is not the only criteria sensitive to cultural standards (see all 
the arguments about whether standards of evidence are different in different disciplines). 
This criterion seems peculiarly vulnerable to the idiosyncrasy of the argumentative 
participants. But this is an issue to explore at another time. 
I agree with Marrero, that in argumentative contexts involving radical culture 
differences, it is not fallacious for one cultural representative to put forth their argument 
without resort to the use of premises acceptable to the interlocutor of the other culture. It 
is not fallacious because such premises provide the actual justification of the practice. In 
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addition, such premises provide a justificatory explanation of why the culture is engaged 
in a certain practice or holds a certain belief. It would be inappropriate and ethnocentric 
for the representative of the dominant culture to claim that the other culture’s argument 
was “fallacious.” But I would not stop there. Respecting the basis of alternative views is 
clearly one of the pre-conditions for reasoned argument. But one should also strive, if at 
all possible, to use argumentation as a means for reaching reasoned agreement. Clearly 
there may be contexts, in which such agreement cannot be achieved -- because common 
ground cannot be found -- but the effort to find such common ground and reach a 
mutually agreeable conclusion from mutually agreeable premises seems to me worthy the 
of effort no matter what the cultural context. 
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